

DPS Lessons Learned from Civil Unrest, May 25 to June 10, 2020

Minnesota Department of Public Safety

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Executive Summary

This initial report briefly reviews activities during a period of civil unrest from May 25 to June 10, 2020, and presents strengths and areas for improvement regarding Department of Public Safety (DPS) incident response. In compiling this internally focused report, DPS focused only on its Divisions. DPS did not review the action of the over 80 other law enforcement agencies that participated in the response. An external and independent review, expected by early summer 2021, will produce a more comprehensive and formal report.

When considering their role in incident response, the separate DPS Divisions identified the following areas for improvement. The full report that follows also identifies strengths of the DPS response.

Command and Coordination Areas for Improvement

- Recognize the need for multi-agency coordination at the earliest point possible and begin operating as a unified command at that point.
- Ensure a Joint Information Center is integrated into the command center at the onset.
- Recognize the emerging challenges the media were experiencing while covering the events due to a variety of dangerous situations. Consider educational outreach to the media, credentialing of media, and training for law enforcement on working with the media during civil unrest.
- Create clear lines of operational control for the various entities involved when operating under unified command.
- Encourage local elected leaders to familiarize themselves with how to submit requests seeking Minnesota National Guard assistance.

Operational Areas for Improvement

- Clearly identify roles between the State Emergency Operations Center and the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC).
- Ensure more clarity for local law enforcement agencies about mission requests to the MACC and about requirements for support from the Minnesota National Guard.
- Encompass smaller, nimble LE groups, as well as larger units, in pre-planning for incidents.
- Involve the Minnesota Department of Transportation from the start in activation of the MACC.

Communications Technology and Capabilities Areas for Improvement

- Use a communications leader early for radio talk group design and assignments concerning the statewide Allied Radio Matrix for Emergency Response system.
- Display for the unified command leadership high-priority service calls from the incident to increase situational awareness for response leaders.

Logistics Areas for Improvement

- Always have a member of the logistics group in the MACC to clarify requests and understand needs.
- Create a streamlined ordering process for supplies and equipment.
- Develop a larger pool of State logistics personnel to staff multiple staging locations and assist.
- Hold daily conference calls for the site managers at staging locations to discuss needs and improve coordination.

- Leverage existing technology to comprehensively credential response personnel and account for them at the onset, understanding that responding to an unplanned incident may cause gaps in personnel inventories.

Fire and Life Safety Areas for Improvement

- Seat a liaison from the key local fire departments at the State Fire Marshal desk in the MACC.
- In advance of incidents, identify personnel who can provide medical support and participate in initial deployments.
- Develop a plan for how law enforcement can support safe response by fire departments.
- Include some additional State Fire Marshal stakeholders in the Multi-Jurisdictional Exercise Team that discusses hazmat and biological incidents and sets the course of action.

Intelligence Areas for Improvement

- Establish a standard operating procedure in advance for intelligence operations in the MACC.
- Work with MACC command to establish priority intelligence requirements and questions.
- Have MACC stress the importance of responding to intelligence requests from responding agencies and units.
- Ensure members of the intelligence team are informed of current law enforcement deployment tactics, procedures, and locations.
- Have MACC determine the intended audience for intel bulletins and products at the start so they match needs.
- Foster more collaboration between the intelligence team and both the MACC and tactical operations.

External Information Areas of Improvement

- Improve the flow of information between the MACC and the Joint Information Center.
- Improve the process for data collection and resolving discrepancies regarding incident statistics.
- Increase communications between the Joint Information Center and the intelligence team to better refute false and inaccurate information.
- Assign a communications team from legislative and community affairs to handle briefings.

DPS can use these initial, internally-focused areas for improvement, and the strengths included in the full report below, to advance incident response. This initial DPS report will also be useful for the independent, external review of the State's actions and use of resources during the unrest, which is currently being conducted.

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Commissioner Calls for Initial Review of DPS Activities

Department of Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington directed the agency to conduct an initial review of DPS activities during the civil unrest that followed George Floyd's death on Monday, May 25, 2020, to identify lessons learned. For this initial, internally focused review, the Commissioner was interested in both what DPS did well and what could be improved. At the same time, Commissioner Harrington called for an independent, external, and formal review of incident response from the State of Minnesota overall. The initial DPS review was seen as useful for the external review to come. The more comprehensive and formal external review is expected by early summer 2021.

DPS officials at the State of Minnesota's Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) were made aware in early June 2020 that an initial and internally focused review of DPS activities was likely, even as response operations continued to address unrest and the situation began to stabilize. They were urged to compile relevant notes soon, while they could easily recall events, challenges, and achievements.

This report presents the initial DPS review of response activities for the civil unrest from Monday, May 25 to Wednesday, June 10, 2020, based on information submitted to DPS by the Divisions involved. Most, if not all, of the Divisions held discussions with key personnel to collect information for this review. Submissions came from the following DPS Divisions:

- Commissioner's Office
- Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement (AGE)
- Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA)
- Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
- Minnesota State Patrol (MSP)
- Office of Communications (OOC)
- State Fire Marshal (SFM)

It is important to note that this initial DPS report focuses only on DPS and its Divisions. Many others responded to the civil unrest, including the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT), the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), the St. Paul Police Department (SPPD), other local law enforcement (LE) agencies, the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC), and the Minnesota Department of Military Affairs and its Minnesota National Guard (MNNG). DPS did not seek information from these other entities nor did the agency assess their activities for lessons learned. This report mentions the DNR, MnDOT, MPD, SPPD, HCMC, and MNNG in presenting background information about the civil unrest or in the context of DPS actions and lessons that intersected with their responses.

The Death of George Floyd and Subsequent Civil Unrest

George Floyd died on Monday, May 25, while physically restrained by Minneapolis police officers. Peaceful demonstrations began shortly after the release of a video of that incident. On Tuesday, May 26, the MPD fired the four officers involved in the arrest, and the BCA began an investigation into Floyd's in-custody death.

DPS was closely monitoring the events in Minneapolis during the afternoon of May 26. Sensing increasing tensions and mindful of a potential protest on the freeway, MSP proactively self-deployed its

entire Mobile Response Team and Special Response Team at 19:03 hours and 19:05 hours, respectively. These two teams included a total of 80 MSP Troopers, who assisted MPD at its Third Precinct on both Tuesday, May 26 and Wednesday, May 27.

Starting the evening of Wednesday, May 27, some peaceful demonstrations degenerated into rioting, arson, and looting. On the evening of Thursday, May 28, protestors surrounded MPD's Third Precinct, and officers evacuated the building. Late that evening, the precinct was set on fire. The building was declared a complete loss. Civil disorder, arson, and rioting spread to other locations in Minneapolis and St. Paul.

With its resources stretched, MPD asked MSP to provide immediate assistance to protect life, safety, and property. MSP continued to respond to MPD's call for mutual aid support and requested further support from the DNR.

The cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul activated their emergency operation plans. On Thursday, May 28, the mayors of both cities, having exhausted their local resources, submitted written requests to Governor Tim Walz to activate the MNNG for assistance in providing security and restoring safety.

Governor Walz declared a peacetime emergency pursuant to Executive Order 20-64: *Activating the Minnesota National Guard and Declaring a Peacetime Emergency to Provide Safety and Protection to the People of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Surrounding Communities*. This order:


- Directed MNNG to help provide security and restore safety
- Instructed DPS's HSEM to coordinate onsite support and assistance to affected local governments
- Charged State agencies to work in cooperation with federal agencies to assist local units of government

DPS (through MSP), DNR, and MNNG deployed large numbers of personnel in response to criminal behavior that started in Minneapolis, spread to St. Paul, and then occurred in other locations within the Twin Cities area and in Greater Minnesota, including Rochester and Moorhead.

In the afternoon of Thursday, May 28, Governor Walz approved the establishment of the MACC, which became fully operational at approximately 12:00 hours on Friday, May 29. Leadership included representatives from each of the DPS Divisions, MNNG, and key federal, county, and city LE agencies.

Enhanced mutual aid LE activities occurred throughout the week until order was restored, supported by MNNG and by an actively enforced curfew implemented by Governor Walz on Friday, May 29. The curfew was allowed to expire on Friday, June 5, with the gradual demobilization of DPS, MNNG, and other MACC partners from Saturday, June 6 through Monday, June 8. MNNG and the MACC completed the stand-down on Wednesday, June 10, and all LE participants returned to their respective jurisdictions.

The unprecedented unrest and rioting in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and the surrounding metropolitan area affected more than 1,500 locations¹ and is estimated to have caused more than \$500 million in damages.²



This map marks locations where property was damaged during the unrest, with concentrations in Minneapolis and St. Paul, but damage in other jurisdictions as well.

To restore order over the 15 days of unrest, Minnesota mobilized the largest ever State LE and National Guard team, supplemented by personnel from over 80 governmental units.

DPS Lessons Learned

As with any of its critical response efforts, DPS and its Divisions learned lessons from their efforts to address the civil unrest in spring 2020. Presented here in the Lessons Learned section of this initial, internally-focused DPS review are strengths and areas of improvement identified from the notes and suggestions of the DPS Divisions involved. These initial findings came from DPS Divisions only and may differ from separate reviews by other entities involved in the response, including the after action report prepared by MNNG.

¹ Josh Penrod, C.J. Sinner, MaryJo Webster, "Buildings damaged in Minneapolis, St. Paul after riots," *Star Tribune*, June 19, 2020, <https://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-st-paul-buildings-are-damaged-looted-after-george-floyd-protests-riots/569930671/>.

² Jeffrey Meitrodt, "For riot-damaged Twin Cities businesses, rebuilding begins with donations, pressure on government," *Star Tribune*, June 14, 2020, <https://www.startribune.com/twin-cities-rebuilding-begins-with-donations-pressure-on-government/571075592/>.

Command and Coordination

Incident response from multiple agencies and jurisdictions requires management infrastructure that can advance mission priorities, deploy resources effectively, and avoid duplication and waste. To plan for and manage response, the agencies and units involved need a unified command structure and coordination.

From its initial, internally-focused review, DPS identified the command and coordination strengths and areas for improvement below—relevant especially for the following DPS Divisions:

- DPS Commissioner's Office
- MSP, for mutual aid, coordinated with DNR and other law enforcement agencies

Command and Coordination Strengths

Emphasizing joint action: At the time of the incident, DPS and others identified the need to bring together state, city, county, and federal agencies in a coordinated response to the civil unrest, arson, and rioting.

Unifying command and control: Recognizing the need, DPS established a unified command. DPS also saw the need for control of statewide incident response and established the MACC to command and guide agencies in their support for local efforts, without compromising the decision-making authority of the MPD and other local command.

Leadership: DPS was instrumental in recognizing the need for additional leadership, resources, and coordination under unified command. The implementation of the MACC facilitated the assemblage of leadership required for successful resolution of the protracted incident.

Staffing for the MACC: Already fully activated for COVID-19 and staffed by all State agencies and volunteer organizations, the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) quickly provided staff for the MACC and offered technology and logistical support. In addition, DPS's partners in the response effort willingly provided staff for the MACC.

Command and Coordination Areas for Improvement

Earlier recognition of need for unified command. Recognize the need for multi-agency coordination at the earliest point possible and begin operating as a unified command immediately upon recognizing that need.

Earlier Joint Information Center (JIC) integration. Ensure a JIC is integrated into the command center at the onset. Improve the collection of data points (e.g., arrested individuals) for clear messaging with the public.

Media interaction. Earlier recognition of the emerging challenge of how media outlets were experiencing difficulty covering events across the metro due to a variety of dangerous situations. Consider educational outreach to journalist trade organizations, media credentialing, and training for law enforcement officers on best practices related to working with the media during times of civil unrest.

Clarity of operational control. Create clear lines of operational control for the various entities involved when operating under unified command.

Local officials' familiarity with the Minnesota Emergency Operations Plan (MEOP). Local elected leaders should familiarize themselves with how to submit requests seeking MNNG assistance as outlined in the MEOP, which requires requests be routed through the Duty Officer housed at the BCA.

The MEOP exists to ensure a standard operating procedure that engages the appropriate professionals and ensures a swift response. During the unrest, the Duty Officer received only two requests for MNNG, one from Minneapolis requesting MNNG assistance related to the Fourth Precinct on Friday, May 29, and the other from Clay County on Saturday, May 30. There were no other documented requests to Duty Officer.

Operations

Operational considerations include who will do what, when, and with what resources. The focus for operations is on assessing the situation, facilitating coordination among responding partners, assigning responsibility, and deploying resources to operationalize the priorities set by unified command.

The operational strengths and areas for improvement listed below are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- AGE
- HSEM
- MSP, for mutual aid, coordinated with DNR and other law enforcement agencies

Operational Strengths

Planning operations: DPS and its MACC partners developed and executed a strategic operations plan that ultimately resulted in restoration of order and mitigated injuries, property damage, and potential loss of life.

Establishing staging locations: Prompt DPS communication with MnDOT led to use of MnDOT locations and facilities as staging areas for State resources.

Taking action: The establishment of a Tactical Operations Center allowed tactical leaders within the MACC to choose the best course of action to accomplish the mission, as defined by the incident commander's intent.

Assessing civil unrest: DPS Divisions contributed important, timely data and guidance based on criminal behavior, which allowed for strategic assignment and deployment of resources for the mission. Notable strengths for assessment included:

- Creating a unified intelligence group with established streams of information and reporting structure.
- Using MSP aviation resources for real-time views of areas to assess risks, threats, and focal points for operationalizing the incident commander's intent
- Quickly identifying hotspots and potential flashpoints, including the State Capitol and the Governor's residence

Deploying resources: In their operations efforts, DPS Divisions and personnel developed and employed plans to strengthen protective measures at key locations and worked with partners to deploy personnel

and equipment where needed based on circumstances and intelligence as the incident evolved. Achievements in deployment included:

- Rapidly assembling and assigning MSP and DNR Mobile Field Force (MFF) teams for key roles to restore order and protect property
- Using MNNG soldiers to provide security at fire stations, LE locations, and other key infrastructure sites
- Assigning MSP and MNNG personnel to ensure safe operations at the State Capitol and the Governor's residence
- Developing tactics to embed MNNG staff into MFF groups to provide security for LE MFF activities
- Assigning traffic enforcement teams for interdiction when violent protestors moved around the metropolitan area via the freeway system
- Communicating with MnDOT to implement planned closures during marches and curfew hours
- Coordinating with sheriffs' personnel to handle bookings and transportation for arrests by the MSP and DNR MFF groups, which allowed those groups to rapidly redeploy where needed

Operational Areas for Improvement

SEOC and Unified Command interaction: Clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the SEOC and unified command center and improve their lines of communication.

Local LE requests for support: Local LE agencies need to provide more clarity about mission requests to the unified command center and they need greater understanding of MNNG requirements in order to provide support, including specifics regarding mission and capability needs, number of personnel, locations, and the LE point of contact during the mission.

Plans for both large and small LE groups: Pre-planning should encompass smaller, nimbler LE groups, as well as larger units, to quickly respond to various types of activity.

MnDOT involvement in multi-agency coordination: MnDOT should be involved at the onset of any incident requiring multi-agency coordination through intentional involvement with the unified command center to improve efficiency and response related to traffic control strategies. Resource requests to MnDOT were not processed in a standard manner before MnDOT was operating from the MACC. This led to confusion about the legitimacy of the requests, questions about the fit with response tactics, and duplication of efforts and resources. Early involvement to help mitigate confusion related to road closures and ensure the appropriate deployment of law enforcement resources with MnDOT, as necessary to safely close roads.

Communications Technology and Capabilities

Effective, coordinated incident response requires adequate and interoperable communications methods and technology. Responders need to communicate with each other and receive and analyze information from members of the public affected by the incident.

The strengths and areas for improvement below regarding communications technology and capabilities are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- AGE

- BCA
- HSEM
- MSP

Communications Technology and Capabilities Strengths

Communicating with the MACC: DPS worked with partners to create a dedicated MACC hotline phone number that allowed responders to easily contact the MACC with questions and resource requests.

Establishing communications across response partners: Use of the Allied Radio Matrix for Emergency Response (ARMER) by DPS Divisions and incident response partners allowed agencies and units in different radio talk groups to communicate with each other. Established in 2004, ARMER allows shared, 700/800 MHz digital trunked radio communication among approved, participating governments and organizations in Minnesota.

Offered Assistance to Minneapolis with emergency calls: MSP offered telecommunicators and dispatchers to support the Minneapolis Emergency Communication Center when it was overwhelmed by calls from the public about incendiary devices and fires.

Communications Technology and Capabilities Areas for Improvement

Improvements for ARMER: Use a trained communications leader for radio talk group design and assignments as soon as practical to ensure that ARMER system assignments are organized for adequate capacity and flexibility.

Priority calls: Display high-priority service calls related to the incident in order to provide incident response leaders with situational awareness of criminal activity.

Logistics

Incident response presents logistical challenges as responding agencies and units strive to move personnel and equipment to affected locations. Logistics address the timely allocation and distribution of resources and support of the resources to maintain operational effectiveness

The logistics strengths and areas for improvement listed below are especially relevant for the following DPS Division:

- HSEM

Logistics Strengths

Establishing and maintaining the logistics function: HSEM quickly established 24-hour logistics operations to support response and remained flexible throughout the duration of the incident, adapting to the constantly changing needs of LE, firefighters, and the MNNG.

Supporting partners for response: The HSEM logistics group quickly shifted from a focus on COVID-19 activities to support for State personnel and partners responding to the civil unrest—in total, more than 7,000 personnel at four staging locations in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.

Tracking deployed equipment: HSEM maintained a comprehensive inventory of deployed equipment—both purchased and rented—for collection after the response.

Securing staging areas: HSEM identified the need for access control at the staging locations so that authorized responders could enter and others could not, which led to appropriate security measures at those locations.

Requesting aid from other states: HSEM used the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to request incident response assistance from other states. The EMAC is a mutual aid agreement and partnership that allows states to assist one another during emergencies.

Finding supplies of chemical agents: HSEM initiated the process for locating chemical munitions from LE partners and through direct coordination with vendors when the need for significant amounts made it necessary to obtain them from multiple sources beyond contracted vendors.

Logistics Areas for Improvement

Coordination with unified command: A member of the logistics group for incident response should be onsite at the unified command center to intake, clarify, and better understand the request as it applies to mission and needs.

Process for ordering supplies: Create a streamlined ordering process for supplies and equipment to avoid duplication, ensure on-time delivery, and eliminate costs that result if unnecessary items are ordered.

State logistics personnel: Develop a larger pool of State logistics personnel to staff multiple staging locations for incident response and to assist with logistics processes.

Coordination at staging sites: Site managers at staging locations should have daily conference calls with each other to discuss their needs and improve coordination.

Credentialing and tracking personnel: Leverage existing technology to comprehensively credential response personnel and account for them at the onset and throughout the duration of the incident.

Fire and Life Safety Operations

Fires and other threats to life safety present a critical challenge for agencies and units responding to civil unrest. If criminals are setting fires, fire departments must be able to respond. Uncontrolled fires embolden criminals and lead to more fires. Effective response to fires protects life, safety, and property and demonstrates that the situation is under control.

The strengths and areas for improvement listed below regarding fire and life safety are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- SFM
- HSEM

Fire and Life Safety Operations Strengths

Connecting with the MACC: SFM had a dedicated desk in the MACC and assisted in facilitation of fire-related requests.

Providing expertise: SFM offered specialized expertise to help guide decisions related to fire suppression, hazardous materials, and other challenges.

Linking to key State resources: SFM linked to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives for arson investigations, and the State's bomb squads and hazmat response teams had direct contact with the SFM desk at the MACC so as to be available when needed.

Linking to local fire chiefs: SFM maintained direct and constant contact with chief fire officers in affected cities, rapidly connecting them with other State agencies in the MACC as appropriate.

Supporting fire departments statewide: As unrest expanded beyond the Twin Cities metropolitan area, SFM shared and received intelligence from fire departments across the state and stood ready to mobilize fire department resources through the Chief Mutual Aid Plan. That plan provides local fire chiefs with easy access to fire service resources in major emergencies.

Coordinating with the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC): While not a State agency, HCMC also had a dedicated desk in the MACC and was able, through the SFM desk, to facilitate requests for emergency medical service and validate the MACC's concept for operations.

Requesting help from DNR: HSEM requested trained first responders from DNR, who staffed the staging locations, quickly treated minor injuries for LE personnel returning to those bases, and served as the safety officers at those locations.

Fire and Life Safety Areas for Improvement

Involve local fire departments: Seat a liaison from the Minneapolis and St. Paul Fire Departments at the SFM desk in the unified command center to better anticipate local fire service needs, improve communications, and make tasking more efficient.

Life safety support from State agencies: Prior to future incidents, identify personnel from other State agencies who can provide medical support and participate in initial deployments.

Safe response to fires: Develop an integrated plan for how law enforcement can support safe response to fires by firefighters.

SFM and the Multi-Jurisdictional Exercise Team (M-JET) group: The M-JET group did not include some key stakeholders from SFM, which slowed the process of vetting some requests and deployments. M-JET is made up of officials from SFM, the Minnesota Department of Health, Poison Control, the FBI, and MNNG's 55th Civilian Support Team who discuss hazmat and biological incidents to determine the best course of action for local jurisdictions and State teams.

Intelligence Gathering and Sharing

Those responding to a large-scale incident of civil unrest need clear and timely information. Incident command must have accurate intelligence about the evolving situation in order to set priorities and decide on appropriate strategies. Accurate, shared intelligence is critical, too, for the agencies and units that take action in response to the incident.

The strengths and areas for improvement listed below regarding intelligence gathering and sharing are especially relevant for the following DPS Division:

- BCA

Intelligence Strengths

Using the Minnesota Fusion Center (MNFC): The MNFC facilitated collaboration between those onsite in the MACC and those offsite, as well as among all the agencies involved in intelligence-gathering efforts. MNFC used a digital chatroom to engage with its analysts statewide. Operated by the BCA with participation from many law enforcement agencies statewide, MNFC collects, evaluates, analyzes, and disseminates information about organized criminal, terrorist, and all-hazards activity in the state.

Viewing activity in real time: The intelligence team for the coordinated response used live cameras and other surveillance technology to view activities and understand the evolving situation.

Sharing information in the MACC: The intelligence team was able to efficiently share information because it was onsite in the MACC and in close proximity to leaders of the coordinated response.

Developing and producing intel bulletins: The intelligence team was able to quickly develop an intel bulletin and prepare versions either onsite or offsite, whichever was most efficient given the level of unrest and response activity.

Intelligence Areas for Improvement

A better standard operating procedure (SOP) for intelligence: Any improvements in SOP for intelligence operations should be made before an incident occurs.

Intelligence requirements: Work with the unified command staff to establish priority intelligence requirements and key questions for the intelligence team.

The importance of intelligence: Unified command staff should stress the importance of responding to intelligence requests received by participating agencies.

Better knowledge of LE: Members of the intelligence team should be better informed of current LE deployment tactics, procedures, and locations.

Determining the audience: Unified command staff should determine the intended audience of intel bulletins and other intelligence products at the start of operations. Different audiences need different types of intel bulletins—for example, LE command staff compared with LE officers on the street.

More collaboration: More collaboration between the intelligence team and both the unified command center and Tactical Operations Center would have been beneficial.

External Information for Leaders and the Public

For incidents of civil unrest involving response from many agencies and jurisdictions, government officials, community leaders, and the public all need timely information. Those coordinating the response must keep government and community leaders informed. They will be called upon, too, to share information with those affected by the unrest and with the broader public.

The strengths and areas for improvement listed below for external information are especially relevant for the following DPS Divisions:

- OOC

- Commissioner's Office

External Information Strengths

Providing public information: The OOC operated a virtual Joint Information Center effectively and served in the role of lead public information officer.

Working with the MACC and its leaders: The OOC was in regular contact with MACC leadership, both providing information and gathering information for release. The MACC vetted all public messaging to ensure consistent, unified communications.

Providing updates to external leaders: Over time, the Commissioner's Office offered regular updates to elected officials and community leaders, which helped the State disseminate accurate information broadly in a timely way and allowed leaders to better manage rumor control.

Using social media: The OOC conducted a robust communications effort on various social media platforms to provide timely information and to refute misinformation. The website set up for MACC activities—complete with frequently asked questions—registered over 100,000 views.

External Information Areas of Improvement

Information flow: Improve the flow of information between the unified command center and the JIC.

Conflicting statistics: Improve the process for data collection and resolving discrepancies regarding incident statistics, such as the number of arrests.

Communications with the intelligence team: Increase communications between the JIC and the intelligence team to better refute false social media posts and inaccurate reporting by media.

Briefings to legislative leaders and community leaders: Assign DPS staff to coordinate with local jurisdictions and lead regular briefings to legislative and community group leaders. The plan will include the identification of key stakeholders and community members that should be targeted for outreach, briefing schedules, and format of briefings.

Input from the community: In addition to briefings, create opportunities for community groups and leaders to provide feedback related to the public safety response.

Conclusion

In the initial notes and ideas they shared within the agency, DPS Divisions that responded to the civil unrest in May-June 2020 highlighted department strengths and offered areas for improvement. DPS can use these lessons learned to improve incident response in the future. This initial, internally-focused DPS review will also be useful for the independent, external review of State's actions and use of resources during the unrest, which is currently being conducted.